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Chapter 1
Introduction
'Although an application designers first instinct is to reduce a noble human
being to a mere account number for the computer's convenience, at the mot of
that account number is always a human identity" [15].
Online communities bring together people geographically and sociologically
unrelated to each other. Online communities have traditionally been created in
the context of discussion groups, in the form of newsgroups, mailing lists or
chatrooms. Online communities are usually either goal or interest-oriented. But,
other than that, there is rarely any other kind of bond or real life relationship
among the members of communities before the members meet each other
online. The lack of information about the background, the character and
especially the reliability of the members of these communities causes a lot of
suspicion and mistrust among their members.
When a newcomer joins a chatroom, a newsgroup or a mailing list, he/she does
not know how seriously he/she should take each participant until he/she has
formed an opinion about the active members of the group. Likewise the old
members of the group do not know how seriously they should take a newcomer
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until he/she establishes him/herself in the group. If the group has a lot of traffic,
the noise to signal ratio becomes too high, and the process of filtering out the
interesting messages becomes increasingly difficult for a newcomer or an
occasional reader of the group. If users did have an indication for the reputation
of the author of each message, they could prioritize the messages according to
their predicted quality.
Similar problems are encountered in other kinds of online communities. The
recent development of online auction sites, and other forms of electronic
marketplaces has created a new kind of online community, where people meet
each other to bargain and transact goods. Online marketplaces like Kasbah [1],
MarketMaker [18], eBay [7] and OnSale Exchange [20] introduce two major
issues of trust:
* Potential buyers have no physical access to the product of interest while
they are bidding or negotiating. Therefore sellers can easily misrepresent
the condition or the quality of their products.
* Additionally, sellers or buyers may decide not to abide by the agreement
reached at the electronic marketplace, asking later to renegotiate the price,
or even refuse to commit the transaction. Even worse, they may receive the
product and refuse to send the money for it, or the other way around.
Although these problems of trust are also encountered in real world experiences,
the problem is more difficult in online communities, because one has very few
cues about other people by which to evaluate them. Many of the signals that we
use in real life are absent in online environments and thus alternative methods of
adjudicating reputation are needed.
One way of solving the above mentioned problems would be to incorporate in
the system a reputation brokering mechanism, so that each user can customize
his/her pricing strategies according to the risk implied by the reputation values of
his/her potential counterparts.
Reputation is usually defined as the amount of trust inspired by a particular
person in a specific setting or domain of interest [19]. In "Trust in a
Cryptographic Economy" [21], reputation is regarded as asset creation and it is
evaluated according to its expected economic returns.
Reputation is conceived as a multidimensional value. An individual may enjoy a
very high reputation for his/her expertise in one domain, while having a low
reputation in another. For example, a Unix guru will probably have a high rank
regarding Linux questions, while he may not enjoy as high a reputation for
questions regarding Microsoft's operating systems. These individual reputation
standings are developed through social interactions among a loosely connected
group that shares the same interest. Also each user has his/her personal and
subjective criteria for what makes a user reputable. For example, in the context
of a discussion group, some users prefer polite mainstream postings while others
engage in flame wars. Through this interaction, the users of online communities
establish subjective opinions of each other.
We have developed methods through which we can automate the social
mechanisms of reputation for electronic communities. We have implemented an
early version of these reputation mechanisms in Kasbah [1]. Kasbah is an
ongoing research project to help realize a fundamental transformation in the way
people transact goods-from requiring constant monitoring and effort, to a
system where software agents do much of the bidding and negotiating on a user's
behalf. A user wanting to buy or sell a good creates an agent, gives it some
strategic direction, and sends it off into the marketplace. Kasbah agents pro-
actively seek out potential buyers or sellers and negotiate with them on their
creator's behalf. Each agent's goal is to make the "best deal" possible, subject to a
set of user-specified constraints, such as a desired price, a highest (or lowest)
acceptable price, and a date to complete the transaction [1]. In Kasbah, the
reputation values of the individuals trying to buy/sell books/CDs are major
parameters of the behavior of the buying, selling or finding agents of the system.
The second Chapter of this thesis describes the related work in the domain of
rating systems and reputation mechanisms. The third Chapter outlines the
requirements for a successful reputation mechanism for online communities.
The fourth Chapter describes problems specific to electronic marketplaces and
online discussion forums. The fifth and sixth Chapters describe two reputation
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mechanisms we have designed and evaluated. The seventh Chapter describes the
implementation of our reputation mechanisms in the context of an Agent
mediated Electronic Marketplace and an online discussion list. The eighth
Chapter evaluates the mechanisms using simulations and user data from eBay and
Amazon auctions. The last Chapter is the conclusion of the thesis and the
outline of our future work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
We can divide the related work on reputation systems into two major categories:
non-computational reputation systems like the Better Business Bureau Online [3]
and computational ones. The Better Business Bureau Online is a centralized
repository of consumer and business alerts. They mainly provide information on
how well businesses handle disputes with their clients. They also keep records of
the complaints about local or online companies and even publish consumer
warnings against some of them. They do not provide any kind of numerical
ratings for business or consumer trustworthiness.
The computational methods cover a broad domain of applications, from rating
of newsgroup postings and webpages, to rating people and their expertise in
specific areas. This chapter focuses on the related computational methods and a
comparison of their major features [Table 1].
One way of building a reputation mechanism involves having a central agency
which keeps records of the recent activities of the users of the system, very much
like the scoring systems of credit history agencies. The credit history agencies use
customized evaluation mechanisms provided by the software of FairIsaac [10] in
order to assess the risk involved in giving a loan to an end consumer. The ratings
are collected from the previous lenders of the consumers, and consumers are
allowed to dispute those ratings if they feel they have been treated unfairly. The
resolution of a rating dispute is a responsibility of the end consumer and the party
that rated the particular consumer.
However useful a centralized approach may be, it requires a lot of overhead on
behalf of the service providers of the online community. Furthermore, the
centralized solutions ignore possible personal affinities, biases and standards that
vary across various users.
Other proposed approaches like Yenta [11], Weaving a web of Trust [15], and the
Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS)[24] (such as the Recreational
Software Advisory Council [22]) are more distributed. However, they require the
users to rate themselves and to have either a central agency or other trusted users
verify their trustworthiness. One major problem with these systems is that no
user would ever label him/herself as an untrustworthy person. Thus, all new
members would need verification of trustworthiness by other trustworthy users
of the system. In consequence, a user would evaluate his/her counterpart's
reputation by looking at the numerical value of his/her reputation as well as the
trustworthiness of his/her recommenders.
Yenta and Weaving a Web of Trust introduce computational methods for
creating personal recommendation systems, the former for people and the latter
for webpages. Weaving a Web of Trust relies on the existence of a connected
path between two users, while Yenta clusters people with common interests
according to recommendations of users who know each other and can verify the
assertions they make about themselves. Both systems require prior existence of
social relationships among their users, while in online marketplaces, deals are
brokered among people who may have never met each other.
Collaborative filtering is a technique for detecting patterns among the opinions of
different users, which then can be used to make recommendations to people,
based on opinions of others who have shown similar taste. This technique
basically automates "word of mouth" to produce an advanced and personalized
marketing scheme. Examples of collaborative filtering systems are HOMR,
Firefly [25] and GroupLens [23]. GroupLens is a collaborative filtering solution
for rating the contents of Usenet articles and presenting them to the user in a
personalized manner. In this system, users are clustered according to the ratings
they give to the same articles. These ratings are used for determining the average
ratings of articles for that cluster.
The Elo [8] and the Glicko [14] systems are computational methods used to
evaluate the player's relative strengths in pairwise games. After each game the
competency score of each player is updated based on the result and the previous
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scores of the two users. The basic principle behind ratings in pairwise games is
that the ratings indicate which player is most likely to win a particular game. The
probability that the stronger player will win the game is positively related to the
difference in the abilities of the two users. In general the winner of a game earns
more points for his/her rating, while the defeated player loses points from his
rating. The changes in the ratings of the two users depend on their rating
difference before the game takes place. If the winner is the player who had a
higher score before the game, the change in the ratings of the two users is
negatively related to their rating difference before the game. If however the
winner of the game is the player who had a lower score before the game took
place, the changes in the scores of the two players are positively related to their
rating difference before the game.
BizRate [4] is an online shopping guide that provides ratings for the largest 500
companies trading online. The ratings are collected in two different ways. If
BizRate has an agreement with an online company, the company provides
BizRate with transaction information so that BizRate can independently survey
the satisfaction of every customer who makes a purchase from its web site. The
surveys measure the customer satisfaction in several categories, and BizRate
provides an overall, as well as detailed report on the performance of the rated
company. If a company does not have an agreement with BizRate, then the staff
of BizRate reviews the company and provides a report based on the editorial
assessment of BizRate. BizRate rates different features for different categories of
companies, based on BizRate's hierarchical ontology of online businesses. The
scores in each category are computed as the average of the collected ratings, and
they are given on a scale of 1 to 5. The consumer reviews are presented
separately from the editorial reviews, and the companies that agree to have their
customers rate them are labeled as "Customer Certified Merchants".
In the context of electronic marketplaces, the most relevant computational
methods are the reputation mechanism of online auction sites like OnSale
Exchange' [20], eBay [7] and Amazon [1]. In OnSale, which used to allow its
users to rate sellers, the overall reputation value of a seller was calculated as the
average of all his/her ratings through his/her usage of the OnSale system. In
eBay, sellers receive +1, 0 or -1 as feedback for their reliability in each auction
and their reputation value is calculated as the sum of those ratings over the last
six months. In OnSale, newcomers had no reputation until someone eventually
rated them, while in eBay they start with zero feedback points. Bidders in the
OnSale Exchange auction system were not rated at all.
OnSale tried to ensure the bidders' integrity through a rather psychological
measure: bidders were required to register with the system by submitting a credit
card number. OnSale believed that this requirement helped to ensure that all bids
I OnSale Exchange was later transformed to Yahoo Auctions, and Yahoo implemented the same rating
mechanism as eBay.
placed were legitimate, which protected the interests of all bidders and sellers.
However the credit card submission method does not solve the multiple
identities, problem, because users can have multiple credit cards in their names.
In both the eBay and the OnSale systems, the reputation value of a seller is
available, with any textual comments that may exist, to the potential bidders. The
mechanism at Amazon auctions is exactly the same as OnSale's, with the
improvement that both the buyers and the sellers are rated after each transaction.
In online marketplaces like the auction sites, it is very easy for a user to
misbehave, receive low reputation ratings, and then leave the marketplace, obtain
another online identity and come back without having to pay any consequences
for the previous behavior. Therefore newcomers to online marketplaces are
treated with suspicion until they have been around long enough with a consistent
trustworthy behavior. Thus, newcomers receive less attractive deals, than older
users that are equally trustworthy. However, this poor treatment to the
newcomers creates an economic inefficiency, because transactions with
newomers are underpriced, or even do not take place at all. This economic
inefficiency could be removed if the online sites disallowed anonymity, or
alleviated if newcomers were allowed to pay fees for higher initial reputation
values and those users could be committed to lifetime pseudonyms, so that
anonymity is preserved, but identity switching is eliminated [12].
Table 1 Comparison of online reputation systems.
In the "Pairwise rating" column we indicate whether
the ratings are bi-directional or one-directional, and
who submits ratings. In the "Personalized
Evaluation" column we indicate whether the ratings
are evaluated in a subjective way, based on who
makes the query.
Firefly Rating of recommendations Yes Yes
GroupLens Rating of articles Yes No
Web of Trust Transitive ratings. Yes No
eBay Buyers and sellers rate each other No Yes
Amazon Buyers and sellers rate each other No Yes
OnSale Buyers rate sellers No Yes
Credit Lenders rate customers No Yes
History
PICS Self-rating No No
Elo & Glicko Result of game No No
Bizrate Consumers rate businesses No Yes
Recently both Amazon and eBay allowed their users to become "eBay registered"
users, or "Amazon registered" users respectively. What that means is that, they
can provide to the marketplace provider enough personal data, so that the
marketplace provider can find out their real identities in case of a fraud.
Therefore, the users can transact online using pseudonymous identities, whose
link to their real identities is held by the marketplace provider alone. Thus, at the
expense of their total anonymity, the newly registered users can enjoy increased
27
Ow -00 M
levels of trust towards them, despite the fact that they do not have any
transaction history to prove themselves. This approach makes transactions more
efficient from a microeconomic perspective, because the pseudonymous users
can achieve better deals than totally anonymous users since they are trusted more
[12].
Chapter 3
The problem of trust in online communities
3.1 Consumer-to-Consumer Electronic Marketplaces
The emergence of large Consumer-to-Consumer Electronic Marketplaces has
highlighted several problems regarding issues of trust and deception in these
marketplaces. Unlike discussion oriented online communities, like mailing lists,
WWW message boards and chatrooms, in these online marketplaces there is a
financial cost when users are deceived. The major marketplace providers like
eBay, OnSale, Yahoo and Amazon, tried to tackle the problem by introducing
simple reputation mechanisms. These reputation mechanisms try to give an
indication of how trustworthy a user is, based on his/her performance in his/her
previous transactions. Although there are several kinds of possible frauds, or
deceptions in online marketplaces, the users' trustworthiness is typically
abstracted in one scalar value, called the feedback rating, or reputation. The fact
that users' trustworthiness is abstracted in this one-dimensional value has been
instrumental in the success of these mechanisms, because it minimizes the raters'
overhead from a time-cost and usability perspective.
3.2 Discussion forums
Online communities, whether on mailing lists, newsgroups, IRC, or web-based
message boards and chatrooms, have been growing very rapidly. Many Internet
users use chatrooms to exchange information on sensitive personal issues, like
health related problems, financial investments, seek help and advise on research
and technical related issues or even discuss and learn about pressing political
issues. In all these cases, the reliability of the information posted on the
discussion forums is a significant factor for the forum's popularity and success.
The comfort of anonymity is extremely necessary in several cases like
controversial political discussions, or health related questions. However, the
allowed anonymity makes reliability of the provided information questionable.
Therefore, the reputations of the individuals participating in an online community
are fundamental for the community's success [9].
However, the perceptions about the reputations of the users among themselves
can be very different and subjective. My favorite example of this phenomenon is
the "Cyprus List", an English-speaking bicommunal mailing list hosted at MIT.
This mailing list has been the only open communication forum between the two
communities in Cyprus for the several decades2 now. However, the Cyprus List
allows Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to share their interpretations of
history, perceptions and misperceptions, and their goals and expectations from a
future solution of the problem.
The mailing list includes individuals across the whole political spectra of both
sides: from extreme Greek or Turkish nationalists, to moderate and
reconciliatory individuals from both communities. Therefore each one of the
members of the list has different subjective opinions about the quality of the
postings of everybody else. Naturally each member views highly members who
come from their own community, while they consider the members coming from
the opposing side as fanatic and biased. However, moderate members of both
communities will often disagree with their extremist compatriots and find
themselves in agreement with moderates coming from the opposite community.
The major problem of trust among the members of the list is the question of
reliability of the information presented to support the arguments of the two
communities. There have been several examples of members quoting books, or
news articles found at their favorite political publications or websites, which
ended up being plagiarism, pure fabrication or even intentional paraphrasing in
order to misrepresent the original quotation. However in all those cases, several
members of the list provided their unconditional belief and confidence to the
truthfulness of the information, based on their affinity with the person presenting
2 The Greek and the Turkish Cypriot communities have been estranged since the Turkish invasion in 1974.
There are no direct phone lines between the two sides of the seize fire line.
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the information to the list. Therefore if we ask the members of such an online
community to rate how highly they think of each other, we expect to observe a
major disparity among the ratings, which should be strongly correlated with the
differences of the political biases between the raters and the rated persons.
Chapter 4
Desiderata for online reputation systems
While the previous Chapters discussed reputation mechanisms that have some
interesting qualities, we believe they are not perfect for maintaining reputations in
online communities and especially in online marketplaces. This section describes
some of the problems of online communities and their implications for
reputation mechanisms.
In online communities, it is relatively easy to change one's identity [9][12][16].
Thus, if a user ends up having a reputation value lower than the reputation of a
beginner, he/she would have an incentive to discard his/her initial identity and
start from the beginning. Hence, it is desirable that while a user's reputation value
may decrease after a transaction, it will never fall below a beginner's value.
However, with such a positive reputation mechanisms, the beginners are subject
to mistreatment by the rest of the community because nobody knows if they are
in fact new users or bad ones who just switched identities. Hence, trustworthy
beginners will have to accept less attractive deals in the context of an ecommerce
community, or the information they provide on a discussion community will be
undervalued until they establish themselves. Therefore, the mistreatment of
newcomers creates an inherent economic inefficiency, because the monetary, or
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information transactions of the newcomers are undervalued. This economic
inefficiency can be faced either by disallowing anonymity, or by allowing users to
purchase reputation points for a monetary value [12]. However, mi such a model
we need to charge for names in the first place and enforce persistent
pseudonymous identities [12]. Despite the benefits of this model, we decided
against it because of the requirement for persistent pseudonymous identities. In
some forms of online communities it is desirable to allow users to have multiple
personalities and/or switch identities. For example, in political discussions
forums, like the Cyprus List [6], it is very important to allow some users to
maintain different personalities, than the ones they use on their respective Greek
or Turkish community mailing lists. Because of these reasons, we decided to a
first desideratum for online reputation mechanisms, namely that it is desirable
that a beginner cannot start with a reputation above the minimum allowed by the
system.
In addition, users who have very low reputation ratings should be able to
improve their ratings at almost the same rate as a beginner. This implies that the
reputation value of users should not be the arithmetic average of all of their
ratings since this would give the users who perform relatively poorly in the
beginning an incentive to get rid of their bad reputation history by adopting a
new identity.
Therefore, a successful online reputation mechanism has to be based on a
positive reputation system. However, having the users start with minimum
reputation is not necessarily the only viable solution. An alternative approach [12]
would be to allow newcomers to pay entry fees in order to be considered
trustworthy. This approach would be very applicable in online marketplaces,
where the interaction is clearly monetary based. However, it would probably be
unwelcome in other more casual forms of online communities, like newsgroups
or mailing lists.
Another problem with systems like Kasbah and online auction sites is that the
overhead of performing fake transactions is fairly low. This makes it possible for
people to perform fake transactions with their friends, rating each other with
perfect scores each time, so as to increase their reputation value. Likewise in an
online group, the marginal cost of sending a new message is zero. So a group of
users may exchange messages for the sake of creating fresh unique ratings for
each other. Notice that prohibiting each user from rating others more than once
would not solve this problem since a user can still falsely improve his/her ratings
by creating multiple fake identities which can then rate the user's real identity with
perfect scores. A good reputation system should avoid both of these problems.
In order to do this, we have to ensure that the ratings given by users with an
established high reputation in the system are weighted more than the ratings
given by beginners or users with low reputations. In addition, the reputation
35
values of the users should not be allowed to increase ad infinitum as is the case
with eBay, where a seller can cheat 20% of the time but still maintain a
monotonically increasing reputation value.
Reputation mechanisms have to be able to quantify the subjective expectations
[5] of the users, based on their past experiences on the online community.
Therefore, it is desirable that the reputation mechanisms can provide
personalized evaluations, based on the subjective criteria of the users engaged in
an online interaction.
Finally, we have to consider the memory of the reputation system [19]. We know
that the larger the number of ratings used in the evaluation of reputation values
the better the predictability of the mechanism. However, since the reputation
values are associated with human individuals and humans change their behavior
over time, it is desirable to disregard very old ratings. Thus, it is desirable that the
predicted reputation values are closer to the current behavior of the individuals
rather than their overall performance.
The desiderata described here are by no means universally applicable to any kind
of online community. For example, the requirement for minimal initial
reputations can be relaxed if our online community consists of people who know
each other [27].
Chapter 5
Sporas: A reputation mechanism for loosely
connected communities
Keeping in mind the discussion presented in the previous Chapter, Sporas
provides a reputation service based on the following principles:
1. New users start with a minimum reputation value, and they build up
reputation during their activity on the system.
2. The reputation value of a user never falls below the reputation of a new
user.
3. After each transaction, the reputation values of the involved users are
updated according to the feedback provided by the other parties which reflect
their trustworthiness in the latest transaction.
4. Two users may rate each other only once. If two users happen to interact
more than once, the system keeps the most recently submitted rating.
5. Users with very high reputation values experience much smaller rating
changes after each update. This approach is similar to the method used in the
Elo [8] and the Glicko [14] systems for pairwise ratings.
6. The algorithm adapts to changes in the users' behaviors. Thus, ratings
must be discounted over time so that the most recent ratings have more
weight in the evaluation of a user's reputation.
From an algorithmic perspective our system has to satisfy the following
requirements:
1. It has to require small computational space and time for the updates of
the reputation predictions.
2. The system has to be adaptively controlled, predicted and supervised
using the accuracy of the rating predictions. The ratings submitted after each
interaction have to be compared with the predicted ones, and their difference
used as an input to the recursive function
3. Old predictions have to be discounted and the system has to be a biased
estimator of the most recent behavior.
Based on these requirements we propose to estimate the time varying reputation
of a user using the following algorithm:
New users start with reputation values equal to 0 and can advance up the
maximum of 3000, so lets call our reputation range D=3000. The reputation
ratings, W,, vary from 0.1 for terrible to 1 for perfect. The minimum reputation
rating, W,, is set to be above 0, unlike the beginners' reputations R 0 ,, so that
once a user has received at least one rating, then the users reputation value will be
necessarily greater than zero, even if that rating was the minimum one. That
way, a user is always worse off if he/she switches identities. Suppose that at time
t=i, a user with reputation R,_1 is rated with a score W, by another user with
reputation R oher E R . At equilibrium, E; can be interpreted as the
expected value of W, though early in a user's activity it will be an underestimate.
Let 9 > 1 be the effective number of ratings considered in our reputation
evaluation. We then propose the Sporas formula [Equation 1], which is a
recursive estimate of the reputation value of a user at time t=i, given the user's
most recent reputation, R,_,, the reputation of the user giving the rating, R,"he',
and the rating W,:
R, = R,_, +$ e (Ri_,)R other (W -E, )
(D(R,)1 
- -R_-D)
1+e I
E, = R,_XD
Equation 1 Sporas formulae.
Recursive computation of the Reputation value at
time=t. and computation of the damping function
(D.
The parameter o- is the acceleration factor of the damping function (D, which
slows down the changes for very reputable users. The smaller the value of o-,
the steeper the damping factor (D is. The behavior of the damping function (D
with different values of o is shown in Figure 1, which plots (I for 10
equidistant values of o, ranging from D/100, to 1OD/100. The value of a- is
chosen so that the (D , remains above 0.9 for all users whose reputation is below
0.25
of D. Therefore, it can be calculated that o- 5 D = 0.11
In 9
Equation I shows that the incremental change in the reputation value of a user
receiving a rating of W, from user R"'her, is proportional to the reputation value
R,'ther of the rater.
Dumping Function
1000 1500 2000
Reputation of rated person
3000
Figure 1 Damping function.
The behavior of the damping function D with 10
different values of 07, ranging from D/100, to
1OD/100.
R= R_ + IQ(R,_, )R1''her (W - E1)9i 1 1
> R,_, - c( R,_, )DR D since R,-' ( D
i1 0 -D
> R 1  I Ri_, = 0-1 R 1 , since c(R 1,) 10 9
>0, since0>1
Also,if R,= D - x, and x 0
R, = D - x +$ (R,_)R,"'h'' (W. - (D - x#) D)1
: D- x + Q(RiI)R~oher (1-(D-x)/D), since W, 1
9
_ D-x + IQ(R,_,)DxID, since R,'ther D
< D-x+-, since 't(R,_,) 1
< D, since 9 >1, and x 0
Equation 2 Proof of lower and upper bounds of
the recursive estinates ofR,
In addition, as we can see from Equation 2, the recursive estimates of R, are
always positive, thus no user can have a rating value lower than that of a
beginner, and those estimates have an upper bound of D.
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Figure 2 Buildup of reputation
Simulation with 10 different users over 100 ratings
with 0=1 0
The predicted rating of a user is expressed as the current reputation value over
the maximum reputation value allowed in the system. Thus if the submitted
rating for a user is less than his/her desired rating value, the reputation value of
the user decreases.
Equation 1 is a simple machine learning algorithm that guarantees that if W; is
stationary time series of observations, th-en it will give asymptotic convergence of
1, to the actual R and the speed of the convergence is controlled by the learning
factor .[25]
0
1The value of - determines how fast the reputation value of the user changes
0
1
after each rating. The smaller the value of - the longer the memory of the
0
system. Thus, just like credit card history [10], even if a user enters the system
with a very low reputation, if his/her reliability improves, his/her reputation value
will not suffer forever from the past poor behavior.
Reliability of the Reputation value predictions
Using a similar approach to the Glicko system we have incorporated into the
system a measure of the reliability of the users' reputations. The reliability is
measured by the reputation deviation (RD) of the estimated reputations. The
recursively estimated RD of the algorithm is an indication of the predictive power
of the algorithm for a particular user. Therefore, a high RD can mean either that
the user has not been active enough to be able to make a more accurate
prediction for his/her reputation, or that the user's behavior has indeed a lot of
variation, or even that the user's behavior is too controversial to be evaluated the
same way by his/her raters. As we explained in the previous Chapters, we assume
that the user's reputation is also an indication of how reputable the user's opinion
about others is. Therefore, the change in the reputation of a person receiving a
rating is positively related to the reputation of a user who submits the rating
[Equation 1]. Thus the RD of a user's reputation indicates the reliability of that
user's opinion for the users he/she rates.
Since the reputation update function is computed according to Equation 1, if we
ignore the damping factor (D, then RD can be computed as a weighted LS
problem [17] defined by:
RD,2 = [2 *RD, + (R,'ther (W, - EjY .T
Equation 3 Recursive computation of the
Reputation Deviation (RD) at time t=i.
Where 2 <1 is a constant and T, is the efective number of observations. Since A is a
constant, T, (which we will set equal to 0 of Equation 1) can be calculated as:
T = XZ 1
i=O 1-2
Equation 4 Computation of the effective number
of observations with a forgetting factor of A
Equation 3 is a generic recursive estimation algorithm of Recursive Least Squares
(RLS) with a forgetting factor of 2, which can be used for online estimations
[17]. So Equation 3 estimates recursively the average square deviation of the
predictions of Equation 1, over the last T, ratings. In fact, if 2 = 1 and T,=i, then
RD, is precisely the average square deviation of the predictions of Equation 1,
over the last T, ratings. However, we incorporate the forgetting factor A in
order to ensure that the most recent ratings have more weight than the older
ones. Note that Equation 1 is not the solution to the RLS Equation 3, as would
be the case if we were trying to minimize RD for a given A. However, Equation
3 is a recursive estimator of the RD, given Equation 1.
With the proper choice of the initial values of a RLS algorithm, with or without a
forgetting factor, the algorithm's predictions will coincide with the predictions of
an offline Least Square fitting of the user's data, if the user's behavior has a
stationary, non-periodic mean and standard deviation [17]. In our case though,
we will deliberately choose initial conditions that estimate a beginner's reputation
to be minimal with a maximum standard deviation. We need these initial
conditions so that there is no incentive for a user to switch identities. So the
beginners start with a RD of D/10 and the minimum RD is set to D/100, and, as
it was explained above, their initial reputation value is set to 0.
With these initial values, we ensure that the reputation value of any user will
always be strictly higher than the reputation value of a beginner [Equation 2].
Therefore, user A, for example, who has been consistently receiving poor scores
will end up having both a low reputation and a low RD, but the reputation value
of A will always be higher than a beginners reputation.
However, the low RD of user A identifies him/her as an established
untrustworthy person. Therefore, the combination of a low reputation value and
a low RD may incite user A to switch identities. However, it is not clear that A
will be better off by switching identities, because although he will start with a
larger RD, due to the uncertainty about his/her trustworthiness, A's reputation
will be lower than before switching identities. Therefore, if A intends to improve
him/heself, he/she is better off by preserving his identity, because he/she can
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grow it faster. If A intends to keep behaving improperly, he/she does not really
have a big incentive to switch identities, because as a beginner, he/she will be
treated equally unfavorably.
The major limitation of Sporas is that it treats very unfavorably all the new users.
This unfavorable treatment is a necessary trade off, if we want to allow total
anonymity for the users of an online community
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Chapter 6
Histos: A reputation mechanism for highly
connected communities
Sporas, described in the previous section, provides a global reputation value for
each member of an online community. This information is associated with the
users as a part of their identity. However, different people groups have different
standards and they tend to trust the opinions of the people who have the same
standards with themselves. For example, if I am about to transact online with
someone I have never interacted before, if a trusted friend of mine has transacted
with the same user before, I am probably willing to trust my friend's opinion
about that user more than the opinions of a few people I have never interacted
with before. Likewise, the PGP web of Trust [13] uses the idea that we tend to
trust someone trusted by someone we trust more than we trust a total stranger.
Following a similar approach, we decided to build Histos, which is a more
personalized reputation system compared to Sporas. In Weaving a Web of Trust
[15], entities are trusted if there is a connected path of PGP signed webpages
between every pair of users. In the case of Histos, which is a pairwise rating
system, we also have to consider the reputation ratings connecting the users of
the system. So unlike Sporas, the reputation of a user in Histos, depends on who
makes the query, and how that person rated other users in the online community.
We can represent the pairwise ratings in the system as a directed graph [Figure 3],
where nodes represent users and weighted edges represent the most recent
reputation rating given by one user to another, with the arrow pointing towards
the rated user. If there exists a connected path between two users, say from A to
AL, then we can compute a more personalized reputation value for AL.
Figure 3 Rating paths between users A1 and A 1
When user A. submits a query for the Histos reputation value of user A, we
perform the following computation:
The system uses a Breadth First Search algorithm to find all the directed paths
connecting A. to AL that are of length less than or equal to N. As described
above we only care about the chronologically q most recent ratings given to each
user. Therefore, if we find more than q connected paths taking us to user AL, we
are interested only in the most recent q paths with respect to the last edge of the
path.
We can evaluate the personalized reputation value of AL if we know all of the
personalized reputation ratings of the users connecting to AL in the path. Thus,
we create a recursive step with at most q paths with length at most N-1.
If the length of the path is only 1, it means that the particular user, AL, was rated
by A. directly. Then, the direct rating given to user AL is used as the personalized
reputation value for user A0 . Thus, the recursion terminates at the base case of
length 1.
For the purpose of calculating the personalized reputation values, we use a
slightly modified version of the reputation function of Sporas [Equation 1]. For
each user Ak, with mk(n) connected paths going from A. to Ak, we calculate the
reputation of Ak as follows:
Let Wk(n) denote the rating of user A, for user Ak(n) at a distance n from user A,,
and Rk(n) denote the personalized reputation of user Ak(n) from the perspective
of user A0
At each level n away from user A,, the users Ak(n) have a reputation value given
by:
Rk(n)= D (R(n -1).Wk(n))/ ZRj(n -1)
Vjk, such that WJk(n)> 0.5
'n(n) = deg(Ak (n)) = |Wj(n
Equation 5 Histos formulae
where deg (Ak(n)) is the number of connected paths from A. to Ak(n) and D is
the range of reputation values [Equation 1]. The users Ak(n) who have been rated
directly by user A0 with a rating Wlk(l) have a reputation value equal to:
Rk(0)= D eWk(0)
Equation 6 Histos formulae
As we explained above we are interested only in the q most recent ratings for
each user, so if mk(n) is larger than q, we pick from those edges the subset with
the q most recent ratings.
Consider for example Figure 4, at level 2. The personalized reputation of user
A,(3), will be:
R, (3)= D e (R, (2). W11 (2)+ R2 (2).W21 (2)+ R3 (2)o W31 (2))/(R, (2)+ R2 (2)+ R 3 (2))
Equation 7 Histos query for user A1 (3) in Figure 4
Since, all the paths at both Level 0 and Level 1, have rating contributions from
only one source per target, it means that the personalized reputation of A, (3) is:
R, (3)= D e(W, (1). W,(2)+ W2 (1) 0 W2,(2)+ W33(1) * W3(2))/(WI (1) +W22 (1) + W33 (1))
Equation 8 Result of a Histos query for user A 1(3)
in Figure 4
Histos needs a highly connected graph. If there does not exist a path from A,) to
AL with length less than or equal to N, we fall back to the simplified Sporas
reputation mechanism.
Level 0
W11(0) W13(O)
Level 1 Wu(1) W22(1) W33(1)
A1()A(2) A3(2)
A1(2))
Level 2
W11(2) W21(2) W31(2)
A1(3)
Figure 4 Example of a Histos query.
User A, makes a Histos query for user A1 (3). The
query finds 3 unique paths of reputable ratings and
evaluates the personalized reputation of A1(3) from
the perspective of A,.
Chapter 7
Implementation
The Reputation Server was implemented as a plugin to the MarketMaker [Figure
6] [17], a Consumer-to-Consumer Ecommerce site at MIT. The same
architecture was also used for an email experiment [Figure 7]. As described
above, MarketMaker is a web-based Agent Mediated Marketplace. Whenever
two agents make a deal on the marketplace, the users are notified about the terms
of the deal and the contact information of their counterpart and the buyer and
the seller are then asked to rate each other based on their performance in the
particular deal. The ratings may be submitted within 30 days from the moment
the deal was reached, and the two users are prompted to rate each other
whenever they login on the marketplace. The user may rate his/her counterpart
as Horrible, Difficult, Average, Good or Great. The ratings are translated to
their respective numerical values of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1 and are submitted to
the backend database.
When the user browses the marketplace he can see the various buying or selling
agents with the reputation values of their owners [Figure 6]. The reputation
values are presented both as numerical values and as colored bars. Since the
number of users of MarketMaker is still very small, the personalized reputation
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values are evaluated in real time, through a wrapper called by the CGI script,
which generates the html of the webpage. However, if we had more users the
calculation of the personalized reputation values might become too slow to be
done in real time. In that case we would use a daemon, which updates the
reputations of all users who are affected by a newly submitted rating, and caches
the results in the database so that it can return the requests faster. When the user
clicks on the image giving the reputation score, he/she is given a directed graph
[Figure 5] with which he/she can visualize the ratings structure used to evaluate
the reputation of the user he is looking at. The global (Sporas) reputation values
can always be calculated in real time, because of the recursive nature of its update
functions.
9
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Figure 5 Histos Visualization.
User A with reputation makes a query about the
Reputation of user B. The query is broadcasted
across A's network of trusted users.
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5 Items forsale:
Record Type: CD
Genre: Misc.
Title: Christoph Stuebbe live act
Artist:
Condition: Good to own but not to play
0 Description:
Re on'
2132 out of 3000
Record Type: CD
Genre: Rock
Title: rush
Artist: rush
Condition: Used but not damaged
Description:
Ri taon.
620 out of 3000
Record Type: CD
Genre: Misc.
Title: Rush
Artist: Rush
Condition: Used but not damaged
Description:
n~uton:
1754 out of 3000
Figure 6 MarketMaker
A user browses a category of CD products being
sold on MarketMaker. The reputation of each user
is included with the description of the product. A
colored bar coding is used to visually represent the
relative trustworthiness of each user. The length of
the blue bar is proportional to the reputation of the
user, and the length of the yellow bar is what that
user is missing to achieve a perfect reputation.
Show reputations I Hide reputations
Sort by: Author I Datel Topic
Chronologically I Most recent first
Options: Show author I Hide author
Back to main kwlobares page
1. Syqxaritiria Stous Diaskedazovtes (25 lines)
From: Dimitrios Konstantakos <Konstand@MIT.EDU>
2300 out of 3000
2. Xpovia Polla se Kwstavtivous & Elenes! (12 lines)
From: Pantelis A Pittas <pantelis@MlT.EDU>
300 out of 3000
3. Patates - Moment of Silence Q MIT entrance (42 lines)
From: Petros Komodromos <petros@MIT.EDU>
2700 out of 3000
4. Re: Housinq/Sales - May 21 (21 lines)
From: Pantelis A Pittas <pantelis@MIT.EDU>
U
300 out of 3000
5. Re: Housing/Sales - May 21 (29 lines)
From: Georgios Sarakinos <gsarakin@FAS.HARVARD.EDU>
2100 out of 3000
6. (no subiect) (14 lines)
From: Nikolaos Prezas <prezas@MELBOURNE-CITY-STREET.MIT.EDU>
0u
300 out of 3000
Figure 7 Mailing List Experiment.
This is a web interface of the Greek jokes list at
MIT. Each user's posting is augmented with the
user's reputation in the particular list. We used the
same scale and color-coding as in the case of
MarketMaker.
The backend and the interface of the reputation server were implemented in
Visual C++ and the reputation values are stored in a Microsoft SQL server. The
html of MarketMaker is created on the fly using servlets. Therefore the queries
about the user's reputations are passed from the servlet being called to the
reputation database. Likewise the submissions of fresh ratings are made through
calls in the servlet code. In the case of the email experiment, the html is created
by a collection of CGI-scripts that access the plain text archives of the mailing
list. The queries and submissions of reputation scores from and to the database
are called through the CGI-scripts themselves. In both the case of MarketMaker
and the email experiment, the reputation data were stored in a standalone
database, so a separate table was maintained with the necessary authentication
and identification information of the marketplace transactions and the message
postings respectively.
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Chapter 8
Evaluation
8.1 Simulations
To evaluate the reputation mechanisms we applied the algorithms in four
simulations. In the first simulation we evaluate the convergence speed of the
algorithm. We have 100 users with uniformly distributed real reputations. Each
user starts with minimum reputation at 300, initial RD of 300 and can have a
minimum RD of 30. The users are matched randomly in each period of the
simulation and get rated by each other according to their actual performance.
Each user's performance is drawn from a normal distribution with a mean equal
to its real reputation and a standard deviation of 100. We assume that we have
reached equilibrium when the average square error of the reputation scores of
users from their real reputations falls below 0.01. In this specific simulation the
system reached equilibrium after 1603 ratings, in other words after each user has
made on average 16 transactions. Figure 8 shows the reputation values for users
0, 1 and 8 over time until the average square error becomes 0.01D 2 . At the time
of equilibrium, users 0, 1 and 8 with real reputations 327.1, 1458.1 and 746.8
respectively, had reached reputation values of 691.6, 1534.1 and 991.0, with RD's
116.5, 86.7 an 103.4 respectively. The equilibrium was reached after receiving 15,
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21 and 18 ratings respectively. Therefore our system can reach equilibrium very
quickly. As we can see from the results of the three users and Figure 8, the users
with high reputations are estimated with a better precision than users with low
reputations.
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Figure 8 Bootstrapping.
Simulation of 100 users with uniformly distributed
reputations. The simulation achieves an average
square error in 1603 ratings. The dotted lines
around each one of the 3 curves, shows the RD of
that user.
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'E User 1
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In the second simulation we show a user who joins the marketplace, behaves
reliably until he/she reaches a high reputation value and then starts abusing
his/her reputation to commit fraud. Thus the user's ratings start dropping
because of his/her unreliable behavior. During the first 1/3 of his/her
interactions, the user performs with a reputation of 0.8D. During the last 2/3 of
his/her interactions, the user behaves with a reputation of 0.3. The user receives
ratings, which are normally distributed around his/her actual performance, with a
standard deviation of 0.1. The reputations of the raters of the user are drawn
from a uniform distribution with a range D. The effective number of ratings in
Sporas is 0=30. We plot on the same graph the reputation values that the user
would have if he/she received the same ratings in a simplistic reputation system
where the reputations are evaluated as the average of all the ratings given to the
user, as is the case with the reputation mechanism of Amazon auctions. As we
can see from the graph, although the user keeps receiving consistently lower
scores for a time period twice as long his/her reputable period, he/she still
preserves a reputation of 0.6D, if he is evaluated using the averages method of
Amazon.com. Hence, in this case, the user can take advantage of his/her past
good ratings for a quite long time and keep deceiving people about his/her actual
reliability. However, as we can see in Figure 9, if the user is evaluated using
Sporas, it takes less than 20 ratings to adjust the reputation of the user to his/her
new performance.
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Figure 9 Abuse of prior performance.
The curve A, shows the computed average
reputation value of a user who starts very reputable
and then starts behaving as an untrustworthy
person. The curve B shows the effect of the same
behavior using the Sporas reputation mechanism.
In the third simulation we present the effect of collusion by two users. In this
experiment both users get rated every other time by one of their friends with a
perfect score. Like the previous experiment we plot the reputations of both
users evaluated on our system and on a system like Amazon's. The actual
performance of the two users is 900 and 600 (out of 3000) respectively. As we
can see in Figure 10, on the simplistic reputation system they actually manage to
raise their reputations to 1781 and 1921 respectively, while with our algorithms,
their reputations reflect their actual performance by letting them achieve
reputation values of 619 and 960 respectively. The reputations of the other users
and the ratings they submit are created the same way as in the previous
experiment [Figure 9].
3000
2500
2000
0C
1 : 1500
a.
1000
500
n
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 00 90 100
Number of ratings
Figure 10 Collusion between two users.
A and B collude and rate each other perfectly every
other transaction. User A has a real reputation of
900 and User B a reputation of 600. With simple
averages they achieve reputations of 1781 and
1921, while with Histos, for a user who has never
interacted with them before directly they achieve
reputations of 619 and 960 respectively.
----------- ------------------- --------- ------ L- -
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8.2 Evaluating Sporas on eBay user data
To evaluate the Sporas algorithm with real user data, we decided to spider the
Feedback Forum of eBay, and use the actual eBay ratings with our algorithm. We
spidered feedback pages for 7269 eBay users using a recursive spidering tool. We
initiated the spidering process from the most recent feedback page of a random
eBay user, and from there on it recursively downloaded the feedback pages of
everyone who rated that user and kept going like that until we terminated the
process.
The spidering tool, kept in its memory a queue of the extracted feedback URLs,
and explored those URLs in a Breadth First Search manner. Due to the design of
the eBay feedback forum, for many of these users we only managed to spider
only a fraction of their actual feedback forum data, because the additional pages
were considered one level below in the tree structure. Therefore, instead of using
eBay's summary data, we recomputed the total number of transactions, positive,
neutral and negative comments, based on the data we managed to collect through
the spidering process. Thus, in our calculations we are missing some of the old
data for several of our users, because the feedback pages on eBay are sorted in
reverse chronological order. Each feedback page on eBay has a at most 25
comments, and our incomplete data are for users with more than one page,
therefore even without the missing data we had at least 25 ratings for each one of
those users. In the evaluation process below, the effective number of obsenvations was
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set to 10, so the 25 most recent ratings of the users with missing data was a good
enough sample for their most recent behavior.
Since users on eBay are rated with either 1 or 0 or -1, we had to scale the ratings
to a [0,1] interval so we replaced them with 1, 0.5 and 0 respectively. For each
one of the users, we calculated the mean and the standard deviation of his/her
performance in the data we have collected. Then for each one of those users, we
applied the Sporas algorithm and tried to predict the Reputation and Reputation
deviation (RD) in a recursive manner as described in Chapter 4.
A -A -A
Figure 11 shows the joint distribution of R- R and RD- RD, where R is the
Reputation value and RD the Reputation Deviation estimated using Sporas, and
R is the average Reputation value and RD the Reputation Deviation computed
A -
from the sampled transactions of the same user. Figure 12 shows R vs. R and
Figure 13 shows RD vs. RD.
As we can see from Figure 11 and Figure 12, the Sporas algorithm, in general,
underestimates the sampled Reputation of a user. This is clearly seen in Figure 12
where we can see that users with the same sampled reputation R , end up having
different estimations for R. This difference depends on how recently the user
committed his/her transactions with low scores. Therefore the time dependency
of our recursive estimation, ensures that users who have been trustworthy in their
latest transactions, rather than their earliest ones, will have higher scores than
others who performed well in the past, but started getting low feedback scores
lately, even if their linear average is exactly the same.
In addition, as we can see from Figure 11 and Figure 13, the Sporas algorithm, in
general, underestimates the sampled Reputation Deviation of a user, compared to
the Reputation deviation computed from the sample of the user's transactions.
We expected to observe this result, because the recursive estimation of the
Reputation Deviation discounts older deviations and tries to make its predictions
based on the most recent performance. However, in some cases we do estimate
a larger Reputation Deviation than the one observed over the whole sample.
This happens when the user exhibits a varying performance during his/her most
recent transactions rather than his/her earlier ones. Since we are trying make our
predictions based more on the recent data, the overestimation of the Reputation
Deviation in these cases is the desired behavior.
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Figure 11 Joint distributions of estimated
differences.
The difference of the estimated Reputations from
the computed Reputations, and the estimated vs..
RD s and computed RD s for each one of the eBay
users
Reputation comparison
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Figure 12 Estimated vs. Computed Reputation
values for the eBay users
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Figure 13 Estimated vs. Computed RD for the
eBay users
8.3 Survey of eBay users
For completeness purposes we decided to conduct a survey on eBay users asking
them key questions about the usefulness and their perception of eBay' feedback
system. In order to pick participants for the survey, we spidered the feedback
pages of eBay and selected randomly users whose eBay handle was an email
address. Then we emailed those users a questionnaire of 7 questions. The
questions can be found in Table 2. The users could respond either through email
or through an html form. We received 2390 responses through the html form
and 1263 responses through email. Due to time limitations we were able to
analyze only the responses given through the html form because the ones
received through email, had to be transformed manually to a machine-readable
format. The results of the survey are shown on Table 3. The most common
answer to question 6 was that the most important problem with eBay's Feedback
is that users hesitate to give negative feedback because of fear of retaliation from
their transaction partner. Therefore many users choose either to give positive
feedback to a problematic transaction, or just not to leave any feedback at all.
There was also very frequently the suggestion that in order to fix this problem,
eBay should include in the feedback forum another statistic, namely the
percentage of the transactions for which a user has received any rating at all.
That way they would assume that a user with a very small number of ratings is in
fact an untrustworthy person, who has not been rated negatively in fear of
retaliation.
Table 2 Questions asked in the eBay Feedback
Forum survey
Q1 Do you check the eBay Feedback Forum before transacting with another eBay user?
ALWAYS
SOMETIMES
NEVER
Q2 Do you pay more attention to the eBay Feedback Forum information when you are buying/selling
an expensive item?
_YES
NO
Q5
Q6
Q7
Do you consider your own eBay Feedback Rating a valuable asset?
-YES
NO
SO-SO
Do you wish you could bring your eBay Feedback Rating to other auction sites?
__YES
NO
Any related suggestions or comments?
Do you want us to send you the results of the survey?
YES
NO
Table 3 Responses to our survey on eBay's
feedback forum
Yes/Always 8611 42% 1753 86% !1273 62% 1830 98% 1399 71 1147%
So-so/ 1076 53% 743 36%
Smtimes
No/Never 106 5% 289 14% 23 1% 30 2% 567 39%
This reluctance to submit negative scores is actually verified by the data we have
collected by spidering the feedback forum of eBay. Out of 8342407 ratings, we
found 8250012 (98.9%) positive ratings, 70398 (0.84%) neutral and 21997
(0.26%) negative scores.
This problem could be alleviated if the rating scale allowed more fine grained
scores, for example 1 through 5 like the feedback system on Amazon's auctions
[1]. If a user A engages in an unsuccessful transaction with user B, A would be
willing to give a non perfect score, if the expected cost of retaliation from B is
small enough not to affect A's future transactions severely. Therefore, the level
of the expected retaliation is a critical factor in A's decision to give a non-perfect
score to B. If the rating scale is binary, or even tertiary, then a non-perfect score
is necessarily a much worse score than a perfect one. While if the rating system
allows better score fine-grain, a non-perfect score can still be above average, and
therefore will be considered better than the second best one in the binary or
tertiary rating system. For example, if user A can rate B on a scale of 1 to 5, it
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will be more willing to give a non-perfect score of 4 out of 5 (compared to 0 on a
scale of -1, 0, 1), which is also the expected retaliation from B.
Distribution of eBay ratings
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Figure 14 Distribution of eBay Ratings
In order to compare the difference in behavior when users can give ratings over a
wider range, we spidered the Feedback forum of Amazon's auctions. We
collected 13304 ratings, whose breakdown was 9607 (72.2%) 5's, 1893 (14.2%)
4's, 586 (4.4%) 3's, 392 (2.9%) 2's and 826 (6.2/6) 's. The difference is very
significant; on eBay it would seem that 98.9% of the transactions were carried out
without any problem, while on Amazon's auctions only 72.2% of the transactions
were carried out without any problem.
These results suggest that fine-grained ratings may provide a solution to the fear
of retaliation problem. As it was expected, the Amazon rating system resulted in
significantly more 4's out of 5 than the total of -1's and O's in the eBay rating
system. Interestingly enough, there are also significantly more 1's, 2's and 3's out
of 5 on Amazon than -1's and O's on eBay. This may also suggest that the actual
values of the ratings have a psychological effect on the users' perception about
how bad a non-perfect rating is. In the case of eBay, the fact that the lowest
score is actually negative may make it sound too harsh for the eBay users. If this
is actually true, then we might expect a better distribution of ratings if the scale of
ratings of eBay was from 1 to 3 instead of -1 to 1. Unfortunately, we do not
have empirical data to examine this argument.
Figure 15 Distribution of Amazon Auction ratings
Chapter 9
Conclusion
We have developed two collaborative reputation mechanisms that establish
reputation ratings for users of online services. The proposed solutions are able to
face the problems and fulfill the desiderata described in Chapter 4. Incorporating
reputation mechanisms in online communities may induce social changes in the
way users participate in the community. As we have seen in the case of eBay, the
scale of its rating system made the users reluctant to give low scores to their
trading partners, which reduces the value of the rating system. Thus a successful
reputation mechanism, besides having high prediction rates and being robust
against manipulability, has to make sure that it does not hurt the cooperation
incentives of the online community.
In our future work we plan to build a reputation brokered Agent mediated
Knowledge Marketplace, where buying and selling agents will negotiate for the
exchange of intangible goods and services on their owner's behalf. The agents
will be able to use current reputation scores to evaluate the utility achieved for a
user under each candidate contract. We want to study how intelligent the pricing
algorithms of the agents have to be, so that we achieve economic efficiency in
conjunction with pairwise reputation mechanisms.
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